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Yocheved: They arrived, Yoske 
Yoske: Who arrived? 
Yocheved: The Arabs 
[…] 
Yocheved: Look, now he is fighting with a policeman. I am afraid that it 
is just the beginning. You know, people say that the first one arrives, and 
then another one and another one. At the end we will find ourselves a 
minority here. Yoskale, what will we do?
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The above dialogue is taken from 'Avoda Aravit' (Arab Labour), a new TV series, 
written by Sayed Keshua, a Palestinian Arab and an Israeli citizen. In this dialogue 
Yocheved and Yoske, a 'typical' middle class liberal Israeli couple, suspiciously watch 
their new neighbour, Amjad, a Palestinian journalist, who is moving into 'their' Jewish 
neighbourhood in West Jerusalem. Keshua was born and grew up in the Arab town of 
Tira (within the green line, the 1948 borders of Israel). As a student, he moved to 
Jerusalem and after several years of living in the city in the Palestinian neighbourhood 
of Beit Safafa, decided to move with his family to one of the upper middle-class 
Jewish neighbourhoods in West Jerusalem. There, he and his family were the first, 
and probably the only, Palestinians.  
Kashua’s successful TV series cynically describes the crossing of social, 
cultural and spatial boundaries in a Jerusalem proclaimed by Israel as ‘unified’. One 
important feature of the sitcom describes an ongoing process in the contested city 
during the last decade, namely the immigration of Palestinians, many of them Israeli 
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citizens, to Jewish neighbourhoods. According to the available data
3
 about 7200 
Palestinians lived in Jewish neighbourhoods of Jerusalem at the end of 2008 (the 
majority are Israeli citizens), of which approximately 4500 live in what are described 
by Israelis as satellite neighbourhoods, i.e. Jerusalem's settlements that were 
constructed after 1967 on land captured from Jordan - today considered by 
international bodies to be Palestinian; the Palestinians refer to them as colonies. It is 
worth pointing out the percentages of non-Jewish residents in French Hill are 
relatively high when compared to other settlements such as Pisgat Zeev, Neve Yaakov 
and Gilo.   
Despite the colonial status of these sites and the attempt to reserve them for 
Israeli Jews only, Abowd
4
 suggests that they offer urban services and goods that make 
them attractive for many Palestinians 'whose options in Arab neighbourhoods are not 
uncommonly more expensive and difficult to access'. To this it is worth adding that 
good quality housing in East Jerusalem is in short supply.
5
 Indeed, though 
quantitatively the data we noted above might be considered a marginal phenomenon,
6
 
qualitatively, we suggest it is significant for Jerusalem, a highly segregated city, and 
more generally for the study of ethnically mixed cities in Israel.  
‘Mixed cities’ is a term widely used in Israel to describe situations in which 
Jewish and Palestinian communities occupy the same urban territory; four main types 
can be identified. The first refers to cities such as Haifa, where Jews and Arabs lived 
under the same municipality prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. 
The second category includes cities such as Lydda, Ramla, Acre, and Jaffa that were 
Palestinian prior to 1948 and that became dominated by a Jewish majority after the 
establishment of the State.
7
 The third category refers to new Jewish-Israeli towns, 
such as Carmiel and Upper Nazareth, that were established after 1948 as an attempt to 
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Judaise the space of the State of Israel and have accommodated Palestinian migration 
during the last three decades.
8
 Finally, the case of post-1967 Jerusalem constitutes an 
additional typology that forms the central concern of this article. Post-1967 Jerusalem, 
that emerged out of war, is also an example of a Jewish-Arab 'mixed city' although it 
is more commonly referred to as divided or contested, in terms of its urban space and 
ethno-national lines, and within a colonial context, its Palestinian areas are occupied 
by Israel.
 9
   
From a theoretical point of view, we attempt to discuss neighbourhood 
planning in contested cities within the growing literature on geopolitics. As Nagel
10
 
states, despite the relevance of this body of knowledge, there is a tendency in the 
literature to treat geopolitics as a detached topic of study from other social 
phenomenon such as migration and urbanism. This criticism is echoed in Newman's
11
 
proposal that the impact of borders and territoriality is not diminishing; rather, new 
scales of territorial affiliations and borders are recognizable that may be flexible but 
are still selective on different geographical scales, an argument that paves the road for 
reading neighbourhood planning geopolitically. 
This article departs from much of the more well-known treatment of 
geopolitics because it focuses on the relevance of geopolitical analysis of contested 
urban neighbourhood, by which we mean not solely a discussion of international 
relations and conflict or the role of military acts and wars to the production of space, 
but the effects of geopolitical events upon the practices of everyday urban life.
12
 We 
suggest that geopolitics refers to the emergence of discourses and forces attached to 
technologies of control, patterns of internal migrations in colonial context, as well as 
the flow of cultures and capital.
13
 This has effect at urban and neighbourhood scales 
and can be assessed, at least to some extent, as part of urban phenomena. 
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Furthermore, this article is located within the field of critical geopolitics, which has 
sought to challenge the universalist claims of traditional geopolitics that look at 
borders of a post-Westphalian world that has interpreted global-scale shifts as those 
running beyond dividing lines. Such perspectives look at divisions as more deep-
seated socio-political partitions, and critical readings that are offered by several 
scholars
14
 seek to redefine the concept of division and control by understanding power 
structures at both the global and local scales. Following this argument, in the context 
of this article, geopolitics will be used as an analytical tool for studying the flow of 
people and capital that subverts the spatio-political distinctions in colonial urban 
space that are habitually taken for granted in political geography.
15
 A relevant 
example of such perspective is presented by Graham,
16
 which analyses the migration 
of ethnic, national and racial communities into cities and the emerging urban divisions 
and spatial configurations that are far beyond the scope of their respective nation 
states. Graham's critical analysis refers to some of the weakening territorial-urban 
control of the state and the production of social clashes such as the uprisings in the 
French cities in late 2005. These internal colonies, argues Graham, may resonate with 
anti colonial ambitions in our own cities.
17
  
Following the above discussion, we further suggest, that the critical body of 
geopolitics should be located within the growing academic writing on planning, 
architecture, and cities, which throughout their histories have been socio-political 
arenas where different classes, ethnic groups, migrants, and strangers interact.
18
 Such 
an approach is presented by several scholars 
19
 who analyse the ways in which public 
planning in Israel has been striving dramatically to influence the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in order to achieve geopolitical ends. In some detail, these scholars suggest 
that the strategy of planning in Jerusalem has been based on geopolitical strategies, 
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aiming to control demography, to expand the jurisdiction of the city through 
confiscation of Palestinian lands and to exclude the Palestinian inhabitants of the city 
from any strategic planning for the city.   
While such critical analysis of Israeli planning is a tool to achieve macro-
territorial national goals, in this article we consider further exploration of the 
relationships between planning and geopolitics by suggesting that the geopolitics of 
neighbourhoods have to do with a crossing of scales; this works from the 
neighbourhood to the city and then to the colonial apparatuses of the state, as well as 
in the other direction from the macro to the micro.. Important to our argument is the 
fact that these socio-spatial dynamics—whether supportive of or resistant to the 
state’s or municipality's planning policies—take place in a very concrete way and are 
used by individuals and communities.  
Our focus on neighbourhood scale is far from arbitrary. Rather, the concept of 
neighbourhood, as a social and spatial entity, is discursively linked to modernity, 
modern planning and certainly nationalism.
20
  Since the end of the nineteenth century, 
the design of modern neighbourhoods was at the core of urban planning; its vision 
was not only the physical improvement of housing conditions but extended to civitas, 
i.e. the shared community of citizens.
21
 Yet, Western planning ideologies, especially 
in colonial contexts, inherently embody cultural imperialism, and thus present a 
utopian idiom of neighbourhood which is based on a homogenous social entity; 
against such a background, a community where its dwellers are strangers to each other 
is thus rendered problematic. In other words, there is a hegemonic assumption behind 
colonial planning, and a sense of community is taken to refer to the same ethnic, 
national, racial or class group.   
Based on extensive fieldwork carried out from January 2006 to July 2013 
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which included documentation, quantitative data collection, archival research as well 
as in-depth interviews,
22
 this article focuses on French Hill, the neighbourhood that 
was the first settlement of the Israeli Judaisation of East Jerusalem. Israelis consider it 
to be politically and culturally part of unified Jerusalem. Established according to 
modern planning episteme, this neighbourhood is inhabited by Jewish residents, but 
as noted, it is undergoing a process of demographic transformation as Palestinians, 
both with Israeli citizenship and Jerusalem Resident Certificates, have been moving 
there in recent years.  
Indeed, as we will detail, despite the escalating violence following the First 
and especially the Second Intifada,
23
 and the ongoing discourses of enmity, Israeli 
residents in French Hill found themselves facing a dilemma: ‘to sell or not to sell’,  
using Rabinowitz’s words24,  property to Palestinians. While such a dilemma has been 
explored by several studies in relation to Jewish-Arab mixed cities,
25
 we suggest that 
the case of French Hill may exhibit some differences to areas inside Israel. For if we 
consider the matter in terms of Palestinian sensibilities, the question of 'to buy or not 
to buy' property becomes one of existential concern, as French Hill is one of the first 
settlements built on occupied Palestinian land in East Jerusalem, as well as a 
neighbourhood ostensibly built for, and offering public services to, Jewish residents 
only.   
 
 
New colonialism: the establishment of a modern neighbourhood 
As widely documented and analysed, a significant spatial turning point in Israel's 
geopolitical conditions started after June 1967 when Israel occupied East Jerusalem, 
as well as other territories.
26
 Following this, the Israeli government unilaterally 
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annexed all of East Jerusalem, expanded the municipal boundaries on Palestinian 
territory, and applied Israeli law to all of the city (although in most cases, not to its 
Palestinian citizens). These measures were taken despite of international objection 
and lack of recognition. Yet, beyond Israeli rhetoric representing Jerusalem as a 
unified city, the planning policies have contributed to the paradigm of a colonial city. 
Both state and city pursue these policies,
27
 which have persistently promoted a project 
of Judaisation: the expansion of Jewish political, territorial, demographic, and 
economic control to all parts of the city. This has been explicitly manifested by Israeli 
leaders, including David Ben Gurion, whose revealing words were uttered a few days 
after the end of the 1967 war: 
 
Jews should be brought to East Jerusalem at any cost. 
Thousands of Jews should settle soon. Jews will agree to settle 
in East Jerusalem, even in shacks. We should not wait for the 
construction of proper neighbourhoods. The most important 
thing is that there will be there Jews
28
 
  
Israel has used its military might and economic power to relocate borders and 
boundaries, grant and deny rights and resources, shift populations, and reshape the 
occupied territories for the purpose of ensuring Jewish control. In the case of East 
Jerusalem, two complementary strategies have been implemented by Israel; the 
massive construction of an outer ring of Jewish neighbourhoods (including French 
Hill) which now hosts over half the Jewish population of Jerusalem, and the 
containment of Palestinian development, implemented through housing demolition, 
the limited issuing of building permits, the establishment of national parks along the 
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edges of areas of Palestinian habitation, and the prevention of immigration to the city. 
Land use policy in Jerusalem encourages Jewish expansion while restraining 
Palestinian growth. Prior to 1948 Jews owned less than 30 per cent of the property 
within the municipality of Jerusalem; nowadays, Jewish ownership and control of 
property accounts for over 90 per cent of Jerusalem.
29
 Furthermore, Israelis have also 
maintained control of most infrastructures, even those that are Palestinians such as 
major access roads, so that Palestinians have become isolated in their own 
neighbourhoods, cut off from each other as well as from Israelis.
30
  
 
It is within the above geo-strategic logic that an analysis of the French Hill 
colonial planning and design should be understood. Let us start by suggesting that 
despite the fact that the colonisation of East Jerusalem was declared in a government 
decision from May 12 1968, it is the professional knowledge of experts that 
contributed to the implementation of such policy. The first step was the use of the 
legal system; in January 1968 the Land Ordinance for expropriating land through the 
Planning and Construction Law 1965 was invoked. This allowed the expropriation of 
land for public use without any specified use, whether for housing, parks or 
infrastructure. As a result of this act, 3345 dunams
31
 were expropriated in the first 
instance, including the area to become French Hill. Levi Eshkol, the Israeli Prime 
Minister at that time, nominated Yehuda Tamir, to be in charge of the Jewish 
settlement project in East Jerusalem.
32
 In order to avoid any delay or objections on 
planning ground, Tamir was working under the direct administrative responsibility of 
the Prime Minister’s office rather than the Ministry of Housing or the Ministry of 
Interior. In the face of international pressure on Israel to stop the expropriation of 
occupied land, Tamir understood that it would be crucial to prioritise the steps 
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towards the colonisation of East Jerusalem; settlements in the northern part of  
'unified Jerusalem', including French Hill, were the first.
33
  
Figure 1: North East Jerusalem area a general view from North East 
While the case of French Hill illustrates a geo-strategic approach, it also 
stands at a critical topographical point for the newly expanded Israeli Jerusalem. From 
it, there is a visual axis to the Old City, while at the same time, the neighbourhood 
pivots between the main road to the northern West Bank and to the south, East 
Jerusalem. It is also on the road that connects Mount Scopus, and its Hebrew 
University campus, with Israeli West Jerusalem. The connections help to reinforce an 
Israeli weak spot from the divided topography of 1948-67 and point towards future 
settlement. Certainly, the location of Jerusalem's new neighbourhoods, including 
French Hill, did not depend upon the availability of land or planning logic, but rather 
as noted by former Israeli City Engineer (1992-4), Elinoar Barzaki, 'it was a clear 
political agenda to re-shape the city's boundaries'.
34
  
 The initial demographic objective for French Hill was designed to house 2400 
Jewish families. This number increased later due to a decision to allocate 37 dunams 
to the expansion of the Hebrew University Campus.
35
 Public buildings such as 
schools and kindergartens were located on the East slope of the hill, protected from 
the western wind, and the housing zones were designed around the hill top. In the 
spirit of modern neighbourhood planning at the time, the design scheme proposed the 
separation of cars from pedestrians, while most of the housing blocks were planned as 
four storey buildings. At the time, many of the planning decision reflected a cutting 
edge approach to modern housing. 
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In December 1969, the Rogers' Plan (after US Secretary of State William Rogers) was 
published, calling for a shared administration of the city by representatives of the 
three main religions. Such a recommendation was rejected by the Israeli authorities 
and as a result the aspirations for low-rise housing in French Hill were pushed aside 
and three to four additional floors were added to each building in order to intensify 
the Jewish presence in East Jerusalem. Here the inclusion of architecture and planning 
as part of the geopolitical tool-box is essential; even more than most other cultural 
representations, buildings are the manifestation of the political power of the state. In 
the case of French Hill, housing was a key player, and the geopolitical effect of 
modern architecture and planning has had to do with the ability to produce not only a 
tangible manifestation in territory, but also 'new forms of collective association, 
personal habit and daily life'.
36
 This is noticeable in the planning outline of French 
Hill where the south-west side of the neighbourhood was left vacant in order to enable 
a gaze towards the Old City and the Temple Mount. The attempt to create a visual 
axis between the frontier new settlement and the historical centre of Jerusalem's Old 
City contributed to the symbolic construction of the settlement being part of 'united 
Jerusalem'. Such techniques formed components of wider discourse and practices that 
characterised Israeli architecture and planning after 1967. The unilateral reunification 
of Jerusalem challenged Israeli architects and planners who immediately after the 
1967 war, were asked 'to cover the recently occupied land with built facts on the 
ground in order to foster the desired unity of the city under Israeli rule'.
37
  
The architectural response to this challenge was expressed in designing the 
new neighbourhoods not so much as unadulterated modern buildings but within a 
Middle Eastern stylistic vernacular of arched windows, rusticated stone and stepped 
houses. Significantly, such an orientalist interpretation uses its architectural scale and 
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forms as a means of symbolically appropriating the Palestinian built landscape. A 
telling illustration of this trend is expressed in the design outline of Tzameret Habira 
(Figure 2: Tzameret Habira selling brochure. Source: Jerusalem Municipality 
archive), a housing compound built on the eastern slope of French Hill, facing the 
Judean Desert and the Palestinian village of Issawiya. This part of French Hill was 
designed to form low terraces that hug the hillside in a way that is emulates the 
architecture of Palestinian villages. The project houses mainly Jewish immigrants 
from the US, Canada and Western Europe and was considered the most luxurious 
zone of the neighbourhood: 
 
All housing will be built in one or two storey units. These are 
designed so that all houses have uninterrupted views […] The 
general architecture will be Mediterranean in character and the 
overall effect should be that given from afar by the typical Arab 
village which is built inconspicuously into the hills.
38
  
  
 The so-called Arab village in the above description is portrayed as natural; it 
becomes a de-politicised and a-historical object that responds to the local topography 
in good taste, and is seen only from a distance. Nevertheless, this discursive 
appropriation is no other than a purification process based on mimicry which occurs 
in the colonial arena of those in power, the professionals, who desire to create an 
oriental landscape as a mechanism of symbolic indigenisation of the settlers. This 
approach, we suggest, has been a mechanism of constructing the Jewish inhabitants' 
sense of place, as noted in one of the interviews: 
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When we came to live here, the view from the window was 
empty – there was no one there -- maybe a house or two. The 
kids used to play in the valley. Today, you see, there are all 
these illegal [Palestinian] houses in front of us.
39
   
 
As mentioned, the attempt to colonise East Jerusalem was not just territorial, but 
rather to create a new sense of belonging and superiority among the Jerusalem 
(Jewish) inhabitants in their new neighbourhoods.
40
 Thus, for example, special 
attention was given to the new street names that were named after military events 
understood by Israelis to be heroic, such as: Mavo Hamaavak (the Struggle Alley), the 
Partizan Alley, Mavo Hahitnadvut (the Volunteering Alley, commemorating Jewish 
volunteers during World War II), and HaEtzel and HaLehi Streets, recognising Jewish 
militant groups who fought the British for independence in the late 1940s.
41
   
To sum up this section, locating French Hill as the first colony after the 1967 
war to link West Jerusalem and the Hebrew University Campus on Mount Scopus had 
a fundamental role in the process of the Israeli territorialisation of the city. 
Geopolitically it marked the edges of the 'unification' of the city post 1967, and 
through the planning apparatus produced a seemingly natural and historically based 
frontier, which enabled the extensive development of Jewish neighbourhoods on 
Palestinian expropriated land. By so doing, a new cognitive map of a unified 
Jerusalem as the Jewish Capital was produced that became credible in social and 
political terms for Israelis. 
 
A frontier neighbourhood  
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The location of French Hill with its proximity to a number of Palestinian areas, such 
as Issawiya and Shuafat, meant that total control or removal of Palestinians in the 
Jewish neighbourhood would be difficult or impossible. Both geographically and 
symbolically the frontier location of French Hill is significant; it is geographically 
surrounded by contested landscapes, today including a portion of the separation 
wall.
42
 It watches (and is indeed watched by) Shuafat, the nearby Palestinian refugee 
camp, and it marks the edge of the city as it is situated by the main road that leads to 
the Judaean desert. Indeed, as argued by Pullan,
43
 studies of contested frontier zones 
tend to focus on states or regions rather than cities, where, according to Ron,
44
 the 
colonial frontier is conceived as a remote and radicalised region, a resource of Terra 
Nullius. On the other hand, despite strict attempts to command urban frontiers through 
controlling practices such as planning, housing regulations, etc, cities do not normally 
have the apparatus available to states to control frontiers.
45
 The situation of French 
Hill is an example of such an urban frontier. There, the increasing movement of 
Palestinians into the neighbourhood is a result of the geopolitical conditions where 
Israeli surveillance and control over East Jerusalem's Palestinian neighbourhoods 
cause unequal distribution of resources and infrastructure, poverty, social and physical 
deterioration.  
A closer view of daily activities reveals that Palestinian presence in the 
neighbourhood is due to public services that are located there. For example, the local 
commercial centre in HaEtzel Street serves not just Jewish inhabitants but also 
Palestinians from nearby neighbourhoods such as Issawiya, Shuafat, Beit Hanina and 
Beit La'hiya as customers.  The local branch of HaPoalim Bank, in HaHagana Street 
serves both the Jewish and Arab population, as does the post office in HaHail Street, 
and a car insurance agency that is owned by a Palestinian. The unequal distribution of 
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infrastructure and services between West and East Jerusalem is indeed one of the 
main reasons why Palestinians cross the border.
46
  
The proximity of the French Hill neighbourhood to the Hebrew University 
Campus attracts Palestinian students (the majority are Israeli citizens) who rent 
accommodation in the neighbourhood. Sharing apartments is very common, and there 
are some cases of mixed Palestinians and Israelis. HaEtzel and Bar-Kochva streets are 
the most common areas for students, due to their proximity to the University and 
because they are relatively cheap. No formal Palestinian residency statistics exist, but 
from a survey of names on mailboxes in these streets, we learned that the number of 
Palestinians living in this area is stable. For example: in HaEtzel Street 17, from 24 
apartments 5 of them had Arabic names written in Hebrew characters on their 
mailboxes in 2005, with 6 Arabic names in 2010. In HaEtzel Street 16, from 21 
apartments, 4 of them Arabic names written in Hebrew characters in 2005 and 2 in 
2010. In Bar-Kochva Street, 16 from 12 apartments, 1 of them with an Arabic name 
written in Hebrew letters on their mailbox and the same in 2010. The Palestinian 
students use all the facilities in the area, including the bank, post office,  supermarket 
and some coffee shops.
47
 This is perceived as a threat by some Jewish residents:  
 
I went to the café in the commercial centre; it was full of Arabs. 
I didn’t feel comfortable and thus I asked for a take a way 
coffee… We don’t [want to] drink coffee in Ramallah. There is 
an economic interest for the shops in the commercial centre and 
thus Arabs are there.
48
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Like other colonial cities, despite the spatio-political divisions along ethno-national 
and racial lines,
49
 there is an ongoing flow of labour (in the Jerusalem case, 
Palestinian workers) to the white neighbourhoods (in Jerusalem, to French Hill and 
many other Jewish neighbourhoods). This was observed as early as the beginning of 
the 1970s.
50
  
From the early 2000s, during the escalating violence and tension between 
Israel and the Palestinians, the frontier characteristics of the French Hill area attracted 
some major Palestinian bombings and other attacks.
51
 Hence, the Palestinian presence 
in French Hill was heavily contested and feared by many Israelis. One of these 
conflicts was around the presence of Palestinian children and youth in a playground 
situated at the edge of the neighbourhood, that faced east towards their own village of 
Issawiya and was far superior to any play area in their own vicinity. As a result of 
continued protests by the Jewish residents of French Hill, the Jerusalem Municipality 
removed most of the playground furniture in order to stop the Issawiya children from 
coming to this playground. The displeasure of some of the Jewish population in the 
neighbourhood to the use and/or appropriation of space by Palestinians is expressed in 
the words of Uri Michaeli, the head of the local municipality of the French Hill 
neighbourhood at that time:  
 
Gan Hashlosha was built as a memorial for three soldiers who 
were killed in Lebanon. No one has ever forbid Issawiya's 
children from entering the playground and they were welcomed 
at first, but in the last two years the place has become a real 
bother. Issawiya's children took over the playground, drove out 
the Jewish children with threats and knives, teased the adults 
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and harass the girls. Whole families started coming to the 
playground, although it has no sanitary facilities for so many 
visitors. The children of French Hill stopped coming. The 
activity in the garden lasted till late at night, with shouting and 
screaming, until many of the neighbours seriously considered 
moving from their houses.
 52
 
 
 Indeed, below the surface of the arguments presented above, there is an 
additional layer, elusive but also significant, that is linked to the fear and anxiety 
associated with the presence of the Other. As the works of Sandercock
53
 and 
Bauman
54
 reveal, the fear of the Other is a central component in the discourse of 
urban politics. Furthermore, the presence of fear in urban space is not a simple 
reflection of social reality but rather itself a mechanism that produces ‘reality’, one 
that is mediated through discourses of fear and order. This is illustrated in the words 
of the head of the communal administration French Hill:  
 
Tomorrow I will be asked to open an Arab school, and the day 
after to build a mosque. Each person should live in his 
neighbourhood – as I do not want to have Haredim [Orthodox 
Jews] here neither do I want Arabs... I am afraid that French Hill 
will be occupied by Issawiya.
55
 
 
Fear in its political dimension is intensified when the city undergoes 
significant transformations that produce political discourse that is, in turn, shaped by 
those that fear. To some extent, the presence of Palestinians coming from the 
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neighbouring Palestinian districts, as well as Palestinian students renting apartments 
and using public space in French Hill is a good example of the way in which the 
discourse of fear focuses on the 'what and whom' we should be afraid of. For Israelis 
fear is mostly intermittent, sometimes suppressed through their culture of occupation, 
but occasionally made immediate and visible through challenges like the situation in 
French Hill. Because they are under occupation, the fear of Palestinians could be seen 
as more consistent and unbroken, but for them as well, French Hill makes it clear and 
visible as they venture into ‘enemy’ territory with only limited means of escape or 
relief. Important to both groups, and to our discussion here is the spatial dimension of 
fear, which '...does not just involve a relationship between the individual and a variety 
of societal structures; it is embedded in a network of moral and political 
geographies'.
56
 
 
Strategies for survival 
It is important to reiterate the primary reason why most Palestinians have moved to 
French Hill: they desire a better place to live. Homes and neighbourhoods, with a 
good level of housing stock and neighbourhood services, are generally denied to them 
in their own communities. But although French Hill offers better physical 
accommodation, is it a better place to live? This may be considered from two points 
of view, Israeli and Palestinians in French Hill and the Israeli reaction to their inroads. 
With respect to the latter, opposition has become more entrenched and more vocal. 
While the presence of Palestinians in public spaces such as the French Hill 
commercial centre and playground might be perceived by Jewish residents as a 
relatively minor phenomenon that can be controlled, the permanent presence of 
Palestinians who buy and rent property in the neighbourhood is a much more 
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contested subject. There has been not only an institutionalised attempt to severely 
limit Palestinians from living in property in areas designated for Israeli habitation,
57
 
but also an extensive public discourse intended to reinforce the ban; for example, in  
September 2010, a public  ‘Rabbis’ Letter’, called for Jews not to let Arabs rent 
apartments in their communities. This declaration states that anyone renting his 
apartment to an Arab is doing harm – both in the eyes of God and for his fellow 
man.
58
  
As far as Palestinians are concerned, the advantages and disadvantages of 
living in French Hill are far more complex. The wider geopolitical conditions with 
respect to the city of Jerusalem should also be noted here as a central component in 
the explanation of this phenomenon. For many years, the Israeli authorities have 
pursued a policy of limiting new housing in Palestinian areas of Jerusalem, and more 
recently, the demolition of homes built without permits.
59
 For Palestinians who have 
the blue Jerusalem residency ID card, living outside Jerusalem’s new borders 
endangers their status as Jerusalemites,
60
 while for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship 
this new reality complicates their mobility.
61
 Hence, after the construction of the wall 
began, thousands of Palestinians returned to the city in order to protect their residency 
status as well as some of their rights. As a result, there has been an intensification of 
the housing shortage in East Jerusalem, with an accompanying rapid increase in 
housing prices in of about 50 percent
62
 that created pressure on the housing market.  
All of these factors have resulted in some Palestinians with Jerusalem ID or Israeli 
citizenship, who have the economic ability, moving into Jewish neighbourhoods.  
This phenomenon reveals further complexities: Israeli Palestinians who have a 
longer history of living near or next to Israelis and usually speak fluent Hebrew tend 
to be more comfortable with such a move. Jerusalem Palestinians, who may or may 
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not speak good Hebrew and live under more recent and harsh occupation, with 
pressure from their fellow Palestinians to avoid fraternising with Israelis, are not.  At 
the same time, it should be noted that this is an upper middle class practice; mortgages 
are generally not available for such purchases by Palestinians, and cash payments are 
the norm.  Yet, although economic means makes the endeavour possible, the potential 
for political pitfalls are evident in an interview with Mustafa, a Palestinian who is an 
Israeli citizen, who moved to the French Hill in 2005: 
 
In the year 2000 we almost bought a 'villa' in [Israeli] Pisgat 
Zeev. Then the Second Intifada started, there was a tension and I 
knew that we could not move to Pisgat Zeev [...] So, we 
searched for a place we liked. We did not want to live in 
[Palestinian] Shuafat; the municipal services, schools and 
infrastructure are not good there. Because of the Intifada, there 
is often a flying checkpoint at the entrance to Shuafat, and if 
they stop you, you cannot get to work on time in the city.
63
 
 
Mustafa notes that French Hill is close to some of the Palestinian commercial and 
social centres such as Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi Joz, Beit Hanina and the main road to 
Ramallah, thus enabling contact with the Palestinian side, while on the other hand his 
family can enjoy '...modern infrastructure, municipal services. Here there is security 
and sovereignty, it is not abandoned'.
64
 These, as well as nearby Shuafat, are mostly 
middle class Palestinian neighbourhoods supplying shops and services appropriate to  
their residents. The geopolitics of the situation is tempered by specific needs and 
familiar practices. 
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Palestinians who wish to buy a property in the French Hill must negotiate with 
Jewish estate agents or deal directly with individual Jewish vendors who will often 
maximize their material gain in selling property to Palestinians. In some cases they 
are very reluctant to sell to Palestinians. This issue was raised by Antuan, a Christian-
Palestinian lawyer, and an Israeli citizen who is married to a Jerusalem Palestinian. 
Antuan bought his apartment in 2002; it was during the Second Intifada and a spate of 
attacks and the killing of Israelis in the French Hill area brought house process down. 
Despite the relatively low housing prices at that time, Antuan mentioned that some of 
the Israeli sellers refused to sell their apartments to Palestinians.
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Indeed, the discussion of the politics of “free market” dynamic vis a vis ethnic 
and racial exclusion is well-known in the literature, such as the case of American 
racial neighbourhood covenants excluding African-Americans from buying or renting 
housing in “white” neighbourhoods66. It compares closely to Jerusalem where the 
"fear of Arabness", a term coined by Dahan-Kalev,
67
 is a central mechanism of 
racializing the Other, i.e representing and defining Palestinians on the basis of racial 
categories that are used to justify social biases and discrimination. With great 
significance for our case, Balibar
68
 points to the new patterns of racism that are 
formed and organized around sociological signifiers to replace biological markings. 
In other words, the predominant factor in this form of racism is not the biological 
difference between ethno-racial groups but rather the presence of minorities in urban 
space, their movement through social and territorial boundaries, and the perceptions, 
especially by the dominant majority groups, of these conditions. 
However, beyond the social obstacles, as a lawyer who represents other 
Palestinian families that purchase property in the French Hill, Antuan stated: 
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Arabs who buy here are economically stable, so they can buy 
every apartment they are interested in. I personally know around 
twenty families who bought property [...] If you look at these 
families – they are each in a better economic situation than the 
average Israeli family. They can afford 'tosefet Aravi'.  
 
The Hebrew term ‘tosefet Aravi’, used by Antuan, has also been repeated by 
other interviewees. Literally meaning ‘an additional price for Arabs’, charged by 
Israeli vendors, it has become a common expression, codifying the sole access of 
Palestinians to the housing market in Jewish neighbourhoods, while financially 
ensuring that Palestinian buyers offer 20 to 25 percent more for property in the 
neighbourhood. An estate agent who lives and works in French Hill states: 
 
The Arab buyers are offering better prices than the Israelis… it 
creates a dilemma for the vendor. Some Jews will never sell 
their flats to Arabs, they say 'Ill never do it to my neighbours' 
but some others will. As a property agent I will never do it.
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Indeed, contrary to the image of a backward or less worldly social group as often 
presented in Israeli public discourse, Palestinian residents who are economically able 
to buy property in French Hill are upper middle class and often better educated than 
the average Israeli residents; many of them are professionals or academics searching 
for a better housing environment, as stated by Mustafa: 
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We were looking for an apartment… We wanted a 
neighbourhood that we liked, with good infrastructure. French 
Hill is a nice place to live; the neighbours knew we are Arabs, 
they were nice… All we want is to live peacefully.70 
 
But despite the fact that class and the modern western life-style of the 
Palestinian inhabitants of  French Hill is an implicit condition for their presence there, 
from the Jewish side it is just the beginning of a rapid slide to losing demographic 
dominance in the neighbourhood. This dilemma, as suggested by Rabinowitz
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accentuates the tension between the collective ethos of Zionist territoriality and, what 
has become central to the Israel’s economy, a capitalist mode of free housing market 
dynamics where personal economic gain dominates. In the words of a Jewish resident,  
  
In French Hill, especially in Ha-Etzel Street, the process [of 
Arabization] is rapid. The Arabs in our area are upper middle 
class. They come from the North [of Israel] – one of them is a 
lawyer and following his arrival another member of his family 
joined… It starts with the arrival of good people but I am afraid 
that during the years some negative elements will also live 
here.
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In the end, housing does not necessarily make up all of the key features of 
neighbourhood, and this is where hope for some further integration meets a stumbling 
block. According to our findings, Palestinians in French Hill do not partake of many 
local activities. They do not send their children to the local, Hebrew-language school:  
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Initially we did not want to live in a neighbourhood which is 
entirely Jewish since there is a problem with the education of 
our children... when we decided to move to the French Hill we 
decided to send our children to the Anglican School, though it is 
expensive and far away.
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Beyond that, Antuan echoes a common experience among Palestinians residing in  
French Hill who do not socialise with Jewish Israelis, and their use of neighbourhood 
shops and services is minimal and curtailed. Mustafa notes: 
  
We do our shopping in Shuafat, but once a week we go to the 
shopping mall [in Pisgat Zeev]. We have no contact with the 
cultural events here, the kids do not go to after-school activities 
here; the piano teacher is coming to teach them here, at home; 
we take them to visit their [non-Israeli] friends in other 
neighbourhoods. They have no reason to play outside. 
  
Palestinians may have moved to French Hill for better housing. But at any meaningful 
level, they are not recognised as welcome residents of their neighbourhood, cannot 
participate, through both their own reluctance and Israeli distrust. This leaves them 
isolated, even caged, as a small minority in an often unfriendly, sometimes hostile, 
environment. 
 
The possibilities for participation 
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In French Hill, both rights and participation are key issues, and the Palestinians fall 
short in both. Much has been said of the right to the city
74
 in relation to the situation 
of Palestinian citizens in Israel
75
 and here we would like to focus instead on the 
question of participation. This can take a variety of forms; an extensive discussion of 
the pros and cons of participation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is 
worth saying that we consider it here primarily in terms of an urban culture with the 
necessary overtones of political life that the situation in Jerusalem dictates.  
Seyla Benhabib
76
 makes the important points that participation in a culture 
exists from within that culture, and although by nature it is shared, it may also be 
contested. While clearly there is more than one culture living in French Hill, we might 
question to what extent the place itself offers some cultural parameters that, for 
Palestinians and Israelis, are in some ways shared and certainly contested. To this, we 
might add that participation requires some level of corporate activity or public life; it 
is not an individual act.  
To understand how place may play a role in public participation, it is 
worthwhile to see French Hill as a modern westernised neighbourhood in the context 
of an older urban tradition of Middle Eastern cities. These cities had quarters where 
different ethnic groups were not necessarily rigidly divided but nonetheless 
recognisable as such; the cities also had areas where people mixed, mostly in market 
areas, including coffeehouses, baths, water sources. They saw a variety of faces, heard 
different languages and accents, and to some extent they discussed or argued about 
the matters of the day; markets were political places. In the late Ottoman period, 
Jerusalem was a more mixed city, and more nuanced in its ethnic strata.
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To good extent a local and customary order persisted in the city although this 
was rarely comprehended by foreign (mostly Western) travellers who, from the 
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nineteenth century, describe the city has having four quarters based upon religious 
divisions; Tamari
78
 argues that the confessional city was primarily reinforced by the 
British after 1917. Whilst it would be difficult to say that people had any more trust in 
or regard for the ethnically other than they do today, the possibilities of participating 
in city life were probably more institutionalised and embedded in the urban structures. 
We can talk about a spectrum of space from segregation, as in mosques, churches and 
synagogues, to integration, as in markets. In between, people (men) frequented 
favourite cafes, where they met friends and acquaintances and where they knew they 
were welcome, and avoided ones where they felt uncomfortable. On the whole, they 
maintained neighbourly relations that formed the basis of trade, patronage and more 
generally, everyday life.  In modern terminology, we could say that the city centre 
provided places for mediating difference. 
As we noted above, Israel has for the most part embraced modern planning 
and architecture which, as disciplines, have mostly neglected such a mediative 
environment; at best, they have organised cities and neighbourhoods in terms of 
functional typologies with little reflection of the nuanced social structures that are 
common in the Middle East. At worst, they have extended and reinforced the planning 
policies that separated peoples on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Following in the 
footsteps of British planning,
79
 the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem have been 
designed as autonomous enclaves, divided from Palestinian areas by valleys and 
bypass roads rather than by urban places in which social and economic activity might 
develop. If we look today at where there is some interaction between Palestinians and 
Israelis, it often happens in the most mundane areas of life – markets, petrol stations, 
some restaurants, or in French Hill, in the supermarket, post office and bank.
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However these places are relatively few and encounters tend to be fleeting.  
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With respect to the geopolitics of neighbourhoods, there is a clash of scales, 
between everyday life and the big political picture. French Hill can be said to some 
extent to be a microcosm of the Palestine-Israel conflict and rather than the slow and 
undramatic ‘murmur of urban political discourse’ that Appadurai81 claims to 
commonly characterise the confluence of local and global, Jerusalem’s high profile 
means that even the most innocuous of actions are quickly thrust onto the world stage. 
At the same time, the lack of balance between the everyday acts of Israelis and 
Palestinians reflects the asymmetry of the larger political situation, and people who 
are caught up in these circumstances are forced to live in a big but skewed picture. In 
short, daily acts regularly become issues of sovereignty and, as Hannah Arendt
82
 has 
made clear, plurality and sovereignty do not mix.  
One might ask to what extent living in French Hill is for its Palestinian 
minority an act of resistance, in itself, a form of participation as a member of one’s 
nation. For example, whilst many of the middle class Palestinian residents of French 
Hill see their residency as a ‘strategy of survival’, some underline the political 
dimension of their decision to move to a colonial neighbourhood:  
 
...we broke the stereotypes against Arabs. They [the Jewish 
neighbours] feel that we are part of this place… If you will 
measure the socio-economic ability of the Arabs in the 
neighbourhood, it is much higher than the average Jewish 
people... Our presence here has a symbolic meaning, it is even a 
symbolic de-colonization.
83
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Whilst this may offer some satisfaction as an act of ongoing subversion, at 
least at a symbolic level, the problem of everyday participation in one’s 
neighbourhood and community is not solved. Rather, there is the question to what 
extent Palestinians need to relinquish parts of their own culture in order to achieve 
even a minimal level of integration. How compromised are they? To buy or not to buy 
becomes an existential question. This seems to be most important in the question of 
Palestinian polity; not only how much can they participate in Israeli culture and 
institutions in French Hill, but to what extent are they participant in their own culture 
and politics if they live in such a neighbourhood? While they may enjoy some small 
level of acceptance within Israeli circles in French Hill, this is fundamentally opposed 
to the wishes of the larger Palestinian entity that desires the end of the occupation and 
their own liberation. Arendt’s basic description of the polity of the polis as ‘speaking 
and acting together’84 is mostly removed from the French Hill Palestinians who live 
apart from the wider Palestinian collective. It is at this fundamental level – not in the 
with-holding of integration with Israelis, but in their separation from Palestinian 
society - that participation is primarily denied to them. 
 
Conclusion 
Ideally, the urban sphere, in its density and diversity, could serve as a space that is 
“open to flows of people” (Katznelson 1995: 57). Such a liberal perspective relies 
heavily on the belief that the city has the potential for the production of an “enabling 
space” that might disrupt the existing hierarchies and boundaries of ethnic and class 
structures. Yet, as we have detailed, such a view is only partial in the context of 
Jerusalem, which is divided not only along the Jewish/Arab partition but also 
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according to other ethnic divisions that stem from the nature of the Israeli settler 
society.
85
  
The most significant contribution of this article is that it looks not solely at macro 
geopolitical processes namely occupation, colonization and bordering but rather its 
analysis refers to facts on the ground from the point of view of the ground. This 
complementary view of geopolitical processes reveals the paradoxical situation of 
colonial territories such as French Hill. As we have detailed,  French Hill is both a 
well-established settlement, “normalized” by different practices such as architecture 
and infrastructure planning, while at the same time its frontier location on the old 
border makes it a space of negotiation, unexpected migration and habitation. The 
ambivalence of contested frontier and work-a-day suburb is typical of many Israeli 
settlements, but French Hill is particularly vulnerable to such a strained dichotomy 
because of the challenge to the homogeneous Jewish population by its Palestinian 
residents. 
Palestinians are a small minority in French Hill and likely to remain so for the 
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, their presence carries with it larger implications and 
even some concrete benefits. The Palestinians do enjoy better housing and municipal 
services; for some there is the sense of beating the system, and for others, a form of 
resistance. The Israeli interests and concerns are more difficult to pinpoint and many 
would argue that the phenomenon is wholly negative; but at the risk of sounding 
patronising, it would be fair to say that the Palestinian residents of French Hill are a 
small chink in the stone of a politics-driven colonial planning system that is one-
sided, unjust and needing of reform; also important is that Israelis see Palestinians and 
hear Arabic in a city where many segments of the population never encounter it.  
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 But more to the point would be to look at the Palestinian residents in the 
neighbourhood as it pertains to both groups: can we talk about shared space in any 
way? After all, although multicultural cities today in the West are seen as dealing with 
the other, particularly where destinies may exist in tandem. To a small extent, public 
and commercial spaces in French Hill are shared and at a minimal level, some 
experiences of the neighbourhood become applicable to all. This is typical of many 
middle class Western cities where, in Bauman’s words, ‘strangers meet, remain in 
each other’s proximity, and interact for a long time without stopping being strangers 
to each other’.86 At the same time, Jerusalem is a highly contested city and normal 
comments on, and aspirations for, multiculturalism seems feeble here. The 
immigration of ethnic and racial minorities to 'white' middle-class neighbourhoods is 
not a peculiar Israeli phenomenon and has been covered widely in the literature; 
however, the geopolitical discourses of inclusion and exclusion, borders and 
boundaries, demographic control, security and separation attached to it 'resonates with 
a long-standing discourse among the public as well as among scholars and politicians 
who frame Israel as a regional 'ghetto' — which is both 'refuge' and 'island''.87  
As we have shown, such perceptions are produced by the politics of enmity, 
fear and the geopolitical imagination of the neighbourhood as exclusively Jewish-
Israeli. Such conclusions are supported by a report of the Israeli Institute of 
Democracy report
88
 that examines the extent of Jewish Israelis’ tolerance for 
neighbours who are 'other' - including Palestinians, foreign workers and gay couples 
among others; this survey reveals that the neighbourly relationship considered most 
troubling is that with Arabs (46 per cent).  
Two interrelated possibilities of sharing may be cited in the French Hill 
example, possibilities which in themselves are powerful, although it is too soon to 
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understand their impact. Firstly, both groups share the problem of having their private 
lives regularly catapulted into the public realm and world stage. Yet, both groups are 
middle class, educated and living relatively conventional lives in this suburb of 
Jerusalem. This raises the second point: in many ways these two groups are 
remarkably similar economically and professionally if not politically. Ultimately, will 
such profound similarities help to form a quiet if not friendly sharing of the 
neighbourhood? And, would not a middle-class initiative, like establishing a joint 
Palestinian-Israel school with instruction in Hebrew and Arabic, going a long way to 
easing tensions and preparing the next generation for a certain amount of shared 
space? It is in a neighbourhood like French Hill, with its middle class populations, 
that such schemes might bear fruit. 
Although this research raises many questions at this point, it does make clear 
that geopolitics in contested cities is happening at the minute and everyday level.  As 
we have discussed in this article, the geopolitics of cities and the shaping of their 
territorial borders and social boundaries - both externally (the city in relation to its 
region) and internally (between the city's neighbourhoods) - are determined not solely 
through military acts but rather, as we suggested throughout this paper, urban 
geopolitics refers to the emergence of discourses and forces attached to technologies 
of control, in our case, planning. At the same time, patterns of migration such as the 
case of Palestinians moving to French Hill and the flow capital in the housing free 
market are much more loosely related to formal structures, and sometimes act as a 
controlling or unjust policy that has backfired.  
As we have shown, geopolitical perspective is a useful analytical framework 
for studying planning and the production of urban space that subverts the traditional 
distinction between domestic and international affairs habitually taken for granted in 
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political geography. We would also conclude that the emergence of Palestinian 
inhabitants in Jerusalem's colonial neighbourhoods that were established after the 
1967 war, mark new forms of urban dynamics that form inclusion and exclusion as 
well as some new spatio-political possibilities.  
Following Holston
89
 we can conclude that the city is a space in which 
residents oppose and undermine dominant narratives of the state and capital. 
Simultaneously, communities in the city create alternative local narratives that do not 
necessarily reflect the rationale of the nation or of capital; nor do they reflect the 
social hierarchy or the power relations that create it. As this article shows, the 
production of urban space in colonial neighbourhoods cannot be understood solely 
through the binary analysis of top-down processes and policies. Rather, a deeper 
understanding demands acknowledging the bottom-up initiatives and their role, as 
Lefebvre suggests that one can see how a counter-space can insert itself into spatial 
reality “against the Eye and the Gaze, against quantity and homogeneity, against 
power and the arrogance of power” (Lefebvre 1991: 382). 
At the contested boundaries of Jerusalem, it is not surprising to find radical 
urban frontiers manufactured by planning apparatus that as we detailed, have 
dominated the city since 1967. But the frontier neighbourhood, because of its ‘front 
line’ geographical location enables, to some extent, negotiation between Palestinian 
buyers and Jewish vendors, which in turn cracks the demographic homogeneity 
dictated by the colonial project. It would be wrong to attempt to idealise such 
instability; relying on the possibilities offered by free-market housing through the 
'Tosefet Aravi' as a vehicle for achieving the right to the city is problematic, primarily 
because it overlooks the promise of the city to be a space for neighbouring. In this 
context we further conclude that neighbouring in its modern sense, with the full 
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possibilities and demands of participation in a neighbourhood, demands equality, on 
both a legal and a practical level, which cannot be achieved in present colonial 
conditions on one hand and in the context of growing reliance on individuals' socio-
economic mobility on the other.  
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